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Article 3

Ultra Vires Contracts of a Corporation
By

A-RTHL

LAWRENCE MAY

A corporation is an artificial being created by the State
for the attainment of certain defined purposes, and vested
with certain specific powers and others fairly and reasonably to be inferred or implied from the express powers and
the object of the creation. Since a corporation is the mere
creature of the legislature it has such powers only as are
conferred upon it by its charter or articles of incorporation,
and these powers may be conferred in any one of three ways:
expressly, impliedly in one sense as being incidental to corporate existence or impliedly in still another sense as being
necessary or proper in order to exercise the powers expressly
conferred. In treating of the powers of a corporation Chancellor Kent, a long time ago, said that corporations have
such powers as are specifically granted by the act of incorporation or as are necessary for the purpose of carrying into
effect the powers expressly granted and does not have any
others, and this is just as true today as it was in the yesterday of long ago. The charter of a corporation read in connection with the general laws applicable to it is the measure
of its powers. Justice Gray of the United States Supreme
Court in delivering an opinion in the leading case of the
Central Transportation Company vs. the Pullman Palace
Car Company, 11 S. C. R. 478, said, "The charter of a corporation read in the light of any general laws which are
applicable is the measure of its powers, and the enumeration
of those powers implies the exclusion of all others not fairly
incidental." In fact, the articles of incorporation are the
sole guide as to the authority possessed by the corporation
for, as the Indiana Appellate Court in the case of the Seamless Pressed Steel and Manufacturing Company vs. Monroe
57 Ind.App. 136, said, a corporation has no greater authority or power than that granted by the sovereign.power of
the State."
An ultra vires contract is one not within the scope of
the corporate authority under any circumstances, or in other
words, an act of a corporation is properly said to be ultra
vires when it is beyond the powers as conferred upon the
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corporation. But in the language of the Iowa court in the
case of the Marshalltown Stone Company vs. the Des
Moines Brick Manufacturing Company, 126, N. W. 190,
"Whatever may be fairly regarded as incidental to and consequential on those things which are authorized by the charter of a corporation will not be held ultra vires." Justice
Gray, in the course of the same opinion, a portion of which
we have previously quoted, said, "A contract of a corporation is ultra vires in the proper sense when such contract is
outside the object of its creation as defined in the law of
its organization, and therefore beyond the powers conferred
upon it by the legislature." The New York Court of Appeals, in the case of Bath Gaslight Company vs. Claffy 45
N.E. 390, laid down a rule for determining the ultra vires
character of corporate contracts in the following language:
"The validity of contracts of corporations is to be determined by comparing the contract made with the charter,
and if on such comparison it appears that the contract was
neither expressly authorized nor a necessary or reasonable
incident to the exercise of the powers specifically granted,
the contract is ultra vires." Justice Sheras of the Federal
Supreme Court, in the case of the Jacksonville, Mayport
and Pablo Railroad and Navigation Company vs. Hooper,
16 S..C.R., 379, sustained the above rule when he said, "The
doctrine of ultra vires ought to be reasonably and not unreasonably understood and applied; and whatever may
fairly be regarded as incidental to or consequential upon
those things which the legislature has authorized ought not,
unless expressly prohibited, to be held by judicial construction to be ultra vires."
It is a common error to confuse the terms, "illegality"
and "ultra vires," which represent totally different and distinct ideas. A contract of a corporation may be both ultra
vires and illegal, as for example a contract in unreasonable
restraint of. trade, though it by no means follows that because such a contract is ultra vires it is also illegal, since
illegality is not necessarily characteristic of ultra vires contracts. When we say a corporate contract is ultra vires we
mean that it is beyond the object of its creation as defined
in the law of its organization, and therefore, beyond the
powers conferred upon it by the legislature, but when we
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say a corporate contract is illegal, we mean it is illegal on
other grounds, in addition to being ultra vires; that is, unlawful in the sense in which a contract by an individual may
be unlawful. Whether a contract is illegal or not is determined by its quality, and in this connection it matters little
whether it be the contract of a corporation or of an individual; whether it be ultra vires or not is determined from a
consideration of the powers expressly conferred upon the
corporation by the instrument of its creation, together with
those other powers implied in the purposes of its creation
and in the powers expressly granted. Of course a contract
by a corporation to do an immoral thing or for any immoral
purpose, or against public policy, is void and gives no right
of action. The New York Court of Appeals in the case
of the Bath Gaslight Company vs. Claffy, 45 N.E. 390,
in speaking of the illegal contracts of a corporation used
the following language: "A contract by a corporation to
do an immoral thing, or for any immoral purpose, or, to
use a convenient expression, a contract malum in se is void
and gives no right of action. The doctrine, however, is not
peculiar to contracts of corporations. It has its root in the
universal principle that persons shall not stipulate for
iniquity."
When it is said that a corporation has such powers only
as are expressly or impliedly conferred upon it by the legislature which created it, it is not meant that it is unable to
do any act in excess of the powers conferred, but simply
that it has no authority or right to do such an act. It can
exceed its powers and when it does so rights and liabilities
may arise out of such unauthorized or ultra vires acts. On
the subject of the power and capacity of corporations to
exceed their powers and do wrong, the Indiana court in the
leading case of Wright vs. Hughes, 119 Ind. 324, said,
"Corporations, like natural persons, have power and capacity to do wrong. They may in their contracts and dealings
break over the restraints imposed upon them by their charter, and when they do. so their exemption from liability cannot be claimed on the mere ground that they have no attributes or faculties which render it possible for them to
act." The New York Court in the early case of Bissell vs.
11ihigan Southern and N. I. Railroad Company 22 N. Y.
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259, said in this connection, "Like natural persons, they

can overleap the legal and moral restraints imposed upon
them; in other words, they are capable of doing wrong. To
say that a corporation has no right to do unauthorized acts
is only to put forth a very plain truism; but to say that
such bodies have no power or capacity to err is to impute
to them an excellence which does not belong to any created
existence with which we are acquainted. The distinction
between power and right is no more to be lost sight of in
respect to artificial than in respect to natural persons, and
the same court in a later case, Vaught vs. E. Building and
Loan Association, 65 N.E. 496, in the course of an opinion
on the subject said that "While corporations have no right
to violate their charters, yet they have power to do so."
The modern and reasonable doctrine that contracts into
which corporations may lawfully enter are such only as are
expressly or impliedly authorized by their charters is nevertheless frequently disregarded in practice, and when this
is done, and a corporation enters into a contract beyond its
chartered powers the question arises, which has been the
subject of debate and much contrariety of opinion, how shall
such a contract be treated by the courts, and whether the
contract can create any rights as between the parties which
the courts will enforce. There are some propositions pertaining to the general subject which are beyond dispute.
One is that a contract by a corporation to do an -immoral
thing, or for any immoral purpose, or, to use a convenient
expression, a contract malum in se is void and gives no right
of action. This doctrine, however, is not peculiar to contracts of corporations. It has its root, as was said in the
New York case of the Bath Gaslight Company vs. Claffy,
which we have previously cited, in the universal principle
that persons shall not stipulate for iniquity. Another principle of general recognition is that a corporation cannot
enter into or bind itself by a contract which is expressly prohibited by its charter or by statute, and in the application
of this principle it is immaterial that, the contract, except
for the prohibition, would be lawful, for no one is permitted
to justify an act which the legislature within its constitutional powers has deemed shall not be performed. But in
not infrequent instances corporations enter into unauthor-
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ized contracts which are neither mala in se nor mala prohibits-that is, which are ultra vires merely, and not illegal
-or where the only prohibition or restriction is implied from
the geant of specified powers. It is this class of cases which
open the field of controversy. Is such performed by one
party but not performed by the other void as between them,
to all intents and purposes, so that no recovery can be had
under it against the party who has received the consideration for his promise or the benefit of the contract but neglects or refuses to perform it on his part, or is it so tainted
with illegality that the courts must refuse to recognize it
under any circumstances or enforce its obligation, whether
as to past or future transactions? It is with this question
we are to deal.
The reasons why a corporation should not be held liable
upon a contract ultra vires, that is to say beyond the powers
conferred upon it by the legislature, and varying from the
objects of its creation as declared in the law of its organization, are clearly and concisely set out in the opinion rendered by Justice Gray of the United States Supreme Court
in the case of the Pittsburgh,Cincinnatiand St. Louis"Railroad Company vs. the Keokuk and Hamilton Bridge Company, 9 S.C.R. 770, and are as follows:--"1. The interest
of the public that the corporation shall not transcend the
powers granted; 2. the interest of the stockholders that the
capital shall not be subjected to the risk of enterprises not
contemplated by the charter and, therefore, not authorized
by the stockholders in subscribing for the stock; 3, the obligation of every one entering into a contract with a corporation to take notice of the legal limits of its powers." Although it seems perfectly clear from the foregoing reasons
that a corporation should not, on sound legal principles, be
held liable on their ltra vires contracts, there exists much
diversity of opinion on the question, whether, and under
what circumstances, an action will lie on an ultra vires contract. The conflict in the authorities on this interesting question and the confusion in the cases dealing with this subject
are largely due to the fact that since the safety of men in
their daily contracts requires that the doctrine of ultra vires
shall be confined within narrow limits, the courts have sought
to regulate and restrict the defense of ultra vires so as to
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make it consistent with the obligations and demands of justice, and so by the majority of them the defense of ultra
vires has come to be regarded as an ungracious and odious
one. There have consequently sprung up two lines of decisions dealing with the corporations' liability on their ultra
vires contracts. If- the contract has been fully executed
on both sides, or is executory on both sides, no difficulty
arises, for it is true in practically all jurisdictions that courts
will not interefere in the case of contracts executed as to
both parties at the instance of either one of them towards
what has been done, as was the sound opinion of the Alabama court in the case of Long vs. the Georgia PacificRailroad Company, 9 So. 706, when it said, "When the contract
is fully executed, where whatever was contracted to be done
on either hand has been done, the law will not interfere, at
the instance of either party, to .undo what was originally
ultra vire§, and to the doing of which, so long as the contract to that end remained executory neither party could
have coerced the other." Likewise when the contract is entirely executory neither party can maintain an action upon.
it. The almost universal rule as applied to executory contracts is that a corporation when sued thereon may set up
as a complete defense to its liability that it had no power to
enter into the contract-that the contract is, in the strict
sense, ultra vires, and on this particular point the Indiana
court in the oft-cited case of Wright vs. Hughes, 119 Ind.
324, said, "Where a corporation makes a contract that is
in excess of its chartered powers it may well be that while
the agreement remains wholly executory it cannot be enforced. So long as the contract is unexecuted it does not
estop the corporation because the power of a corporation,
like that of a person under a legal disability, cannot be enlarged by the mere form of contract which it had no capacity
to make."
The difficulty arises when the ultra vires contract
to make." The difficulty arises when the ultra vires contract
has been fully performed by one of the parties but has not
been performed by the other party, or, in other words, when
the contract is fully executed on one side and entirely executory on the other, and it is in dealing with this class of ultra
vires contracts that there is found such diversity of opinion
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and direct conflict in the authorities which is shown by two
lines of decisions above referred to and of which we shall
now have more to say.
Some of the courts, notably the Federal and Illinois
courts, hold that a contract by a corporation which is objectionable only because it is ultra vires or unauthorized is
on that ground alone unlawful and void as being beyond
the powers conferred upon it, and that, as a rule, no action
can be maintained upon it. But where the contract has
been executed on one side, and either party has received
benefits under the contract in the form of money, property
or services, an action, quasi ex contractu, or suit for an accounting, may be maintained to recover therefor. This is
known as the strict or Federal rule. Most courts, notably
New York and Indiana, hold that the contracts of a corporation which are objectionable only because they are ultra
vires are not so far illegal that no action can be maintained
upon them, and that the plea of ultra vires should not prevail, whether interposed for or against a corporation when
it would be inequitable and unjust to allow it; thus where
the "party seeking to enforce the contract has performed it
on his part the other party is prevented from setting up the
defense of ultra vires and this is known as the prevailing
rule. There is still another doctrine known as the Progressive Kansas doctrine that has recently sprung up, and
that has been followed by just a very few courts, which holds
that in case of executory contracts neither the corporation
nor the person contracting with it can question the power
of the. corporation to enter into the contract, the situation
being likened to the estoppel to deny corporate existence
where one contracts with the other party as a corporation,
and there is well-considered authority for this position. In
Harris vs. the Independence Gas Company, 92 Pac. 1123,
the leading case on this practically new doctrine the Kansas
court expressed the following opinion: "It would seem reasonable that a system which attempts not only to protect a
party to ultra vires contract from actual loss but where
equity requires it to insure to him the fruits of his bargain
ought, for the sake of completeness and synmmetry, to enable
him to insist upon the performance even of a purely executory contract. It certainly seems against conscience that
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one who has entered into a contract with the expectation of
deriving a profit from it may, upon discovering the probability of loss, repudiate it and escape responsibility by raising the question of want of corporate capacity. Parties to
a contract who deal with each other upon the assumption
that one of them is a corporation are ordinarily precluded
from questioning the validity of its organization. The question of the character of business a corporation is authoriied
to engage in is ordinarily a matter between it and the State,
not open to collateral inquiry; and one who has entered into
a contract with a corporation which is otherwise unobjectionable cannot maintain an action for its cancellation upon
the ground that it relates to a transaction foreign to any
purpose mentioned in the company's charter. The doctrine
that only the State can challenge the validity of acts done
under color of a corporate charter, if accepted, must necessarily protect an executory contract from collateral attack
equally with one that has been executed. The court is convinced of the soundness of the view that in the absence of
special circumstances affecting the matter neither party to
even an executory contract should be allowed to defeat its
enforcement by the plea of ultra vires. The doctrine is logical in theory, simple in application and just in result." The
basis of this doctrine is upon grounds of public policy, and
not upon the ground of equitable estoppel upon which is
based, as we shall presently see, the prevailing rule that where
a contract is executed on one side and is still executory on
the other but the party as to whom it is executory has accepted and made his own the benefits of the contract he has
estopped himself from denying in the courts the invalidity
of the instrument by which those benefits came to him. The
logic used by the Kansas court in rendering this decision is
undeniable, and though the tendency of enlightened modern
jurists is unmistakably towards it, the courts have not as
yet followed it for it will mean, if this view gains ground,
and the courts consequently go this far, that the question
of want of corporate power, just like the question of legality
of corporate organization can only be raised by the sovereign
State, and that if the State is satisfied with the interpretation of the charter adopted by the corporation, and manifests its acquiescence by not prosecuting the corporation,
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and that if no question of public policy is involved no reason
would be apparent why a third party who has actually dealt
with the corporation should be allowed to raise the issue of
corporate capacity.
The champions of what is called the strict or Federal
rule are chiefly the Illinois and the Federal courts. This
rule makes all contracts which are foreign to the nature and
design of the corporation, and which are hence beyond the
powers conferred upon the corporation, and therefore ultra
vires and not enforceable but wholly void and of no legal
effect whatever, and prohibits the performance of an ultra
vires contract and receipt of benefits thereunder from working an estoppel, the effect of which would be the precluding
of the defendant from setting up the invalidity of the contract. Thus in the Federal case of Westerlund vs. the Black
Bear Mining Company, 203 fed. 599, it was said "A contract of a corporation which is beyond the scope of its corporate powers, which it cannot lawfully do in any way or
manner, under any circumstances, is void and incapable of
ratification by estoppel or otherwise, and the corporation
itself may challenge it." The courts make a distinction between contracts which are ultra vires merely because of the
disregard of mere formalities which the law requires to be
observed, and those which are for want of power in the
corporation, and hold that the former can be enforced while
the latter cannot be under any circumstances. On this particular distinction, the Illinois court in the case of Stacy vs.
the Glen Ellyn Hotel and Springs Company, 79, N.E.
133, gave expression to the following opinion: "Where a
corporation is acting within the general scope of the powers
conferred upon it by the legislature the corporation as well
as persons contracting with it may be estopped to deny
that it has complied with the legal formalities which are
prerequisites to its existence or to its action because sich
prerequisites might in fact have been complied with; but
where the contract is beyond the powers conferred upon it
by existing laws neither the corporation nor the other party
to the contract can be'estopped to show that it was prohibited by those laws by consenting to it or acting upon it."
Justice Gray of the United States Supreme Court, whom
we have previously quoted, in the opinion delivered in the
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case of the Central TransportationCompany vs. the Pullman PalaceCar Company, 11 S.C.R. 478, clearly states the
position which the courts take which follow the strict or
Federal rule in regard to contracts that are ultra vires in
the sense that they are beyond the scope of the powers of
the corporation, when he says: "A contract of a corporation
which is ultra vires in the proper sense, that is to say, outside
the object of its creation as defined in the law of its organization and therefore beyond the powers conferred upon it
by the legislature is, not voidable only, but wholly void and
of no legal effect. The objection to the contract is not
merely that the corporation ought not to have made it, but
that it could not make it. The contract cannot be ratified by
either party because it could not have been authorized by
either. No performance on either side can give the unlawful
contract any validity or be the foundation of any right of
action upon it," and in the course of the same opinion he
gave his reasons which justify courts in refusing to hold
corporations liable on such contracts, which reasons are
identically the same as those he gave in the earlier case
which we have previously cited and from which we quoted in
the first part of our treatment of this class of contracts:
"All contracts made by a 6orporation beyond the scope of
their powers are unlawful and void; and no action can be
maintained upon them, and this upon three distinct grounds:
1, The obligation of everyone contracting with a corporation to take notice of the legal limits chargeable at law with
notice of the want of power. Where the corporation has
been held to be estopped has been where the act complained
of was within the general scope of the corporate powers,"
and the same court in the later case of Steele vs. the Fraternal Tribunes, 74 N.E. 121, said, "A contract ultra vires
is unenforceable though it has been in good faith performed
by one of the parties, and the corporation has had full benefit of the performance." The Tennessee court in the case
of Miller vs. the American Mutual Accident Insurance
Company, 21 S.W. 39, gave utterance to the following opinion: "The fact that a corporation has received benefits of a
contract which was ultra vires does not justify an enforcement of the contract but the remedy is a suit in disafflirmance
and for an accounting. The true foundation of the doctrine
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of ultra vires lies in the proposition that every act of a corporation in excess of its powers is an act in contravention
of public policy, and for that reason to be held null and
void. All acts outside the object of its creation as defined
in the law of its organization, and therefore beyond the
powers conferred upon it, are acts not voidable only but
wholly void. "Thus in the case of the Best Brewing Corn-.
pany vs. Klassen 57 N.E. 20, where a corporation without
power to do so enters int6 a contract guaranty or suretyship, the plea of ultra vires is a omplete defense to its enforcement against the corporation, and also as in the case
of the National Hovme Building and Loan Association vs.
the Home Savings Bank, 54 N.E. 619, where a corporation
without power to purchase real estate, purchases real estate
subject to a mortgage and expressly assumes the mortgage,
it may defend against liability on such assumption under a
plea of ultra vires. Still another example of the application
of this rule which we are now discussing is to be found in the
case of the CaliforniaNational Bank vs. Kennedy 17 S.C.R.
831, where a national bank purchased stock of another corporation, which purchase was not incidental to the banking
business and subsequently received dividends on the stock,
the bank could defend against its liability for the debts of
siich corporation on the ground of ultra vires, for since the
purchase is void it could not be ratified and the bank could
not thereby be estopped to make such denial. iBut in the
application of this strict rule of ultra vires the fact must
not be lost sight of that in exercising the powers conferred
upon it a corporation may adopt any proper and convenient
means tending directly to their accomplishment and not
amounting to the transaction of a separate unauthorized
business. As will be remembered, Justice Gray of the Federal Supreme court established as one of the reasons why a
corporation is not liable upon a contract ultra vires is the
obligation of everyone entering into a contract with a corporation to take notice of the legal limits of its powers.
Where a corporation is created and its powers conferred by
a public act a man who enters into a contract with it which
is clearly in excess of its powers as shown by the act cannot
enforce the contract for he is chargeable with knowledge
of public laws and, therefore, of the powers of the corpora-
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tion. So, consequently, the courts which have accepted and
followed this strict rule governing ultra vires contracts have
charged every person dealing with a corporation with notice
of the limitations of its powers, and have held that such
persons cannot plead ignorance of the ultra vires character
of the transaction. The Illinois court in the case of Steele
vs. the FraternalTribunes 74 N.E. 121, stated the proposition of notice as follows: "Powers delegated by the State
to corporations are matters of public law of which no one
can plead ignorance. A party dealing -with a corporation
having limited and delegated powers is chargeable with notice of those powers and their limitations and cannot plead
his ignorance." Since the charter is the law of corporate
existence every corporation necessarily carries its charter
wherever it goes, and every person who deals with it, anywhere, is bound to take notice of the provisions which have
been made in its charter. Thus where a corporation, not
being authorized by its charter, enters into a contract of
guaranty or suretyship, this is clearly in excess of its powers,
and the other party is chargeable with knowledge of this
fact and cannot hold it liable, and this identical point was
upheld by the Iowa court in the case of Lucas vs. the White
Line Transfer Company, 30 N.W. 771. Having seen what
the attitude of the courts is which have logically applied
with almost, but not quite, perfect consistency this strict
rule of ultra vires, the question naturally presents itself as
to what lengths have these same courts gone in allowing
either the corporation or the other contracting party to retain, after putting up the shield of ultra vires and thereby
defending an enforcement of the ultra vires contracts, the
benefits received under such contract without making restitution or compensation therefor to the other party. Fortunately, these courts recognize the fact that the obligation to
do justice rests upon all persons, natural and artificial, and
that if one obtains the money or property of another, without authority to do so, the law, independent of express contract will compel restitution or compensation. Justice Gray
of the United-States Supreme court in the case of the Central TransportationCo. vs. the Pullman Palace Car Company, 11 S.C. R. 478, pointed out the way in which justice
could be done between the parties to an ultra vires contract
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without enforcing such a contract, when he used the following language: "A contract ultra vires being unlawful
and void, not because it is in itself immoral, but because the
corporation by the law of its creation is incapable of making it, the courts while refusing to maintain any action upon
the unlawful contract have always striven to do justice between the parties so far as could be done consistently with
adherence to law, by permitting property or money parted
with on the faith of the unlawful contract to be recovered
back or compensation to be made for it. In such case, however, the action is not maintained upon the unlawful contract
nor according to its terms, but on an implied contract of
the defendant to return, or failing to do that to make compensation for property or money which it has no right to
retain. To maintain such an action is not to affirm but to
disaffirm the unlawful contract." In the later case of
Earling vs. Emigh 30 S.C.R. 672, Justice White of the
same court affirmed the position taken in regard to the principle involved in the foregoing opinion, and now under discussion, when he said: "Altho restitution of property obtained under a contract which was illegal because ultra vires
cannot be adjudged by force of the illegal contract, yet as
the obligation to do justice rests upon all persons, natural
and artificial, if one obtains the money'or property of others
without authority, the law independently of express contract will compel restitution or compensation." The Illinois
courts, like those of the other states which accept and follow
the strict or Federal rule in regard to ultra vires contracts,
have adopted the principles laid down by the United States
Supreme court as to the doing of justice without resort to
the ultra vires contract, and in the case of the United States
Brewing Company vs. Dolese and Shepard Company, 102
N.E. 753, the Illinois court had this to say: "Although a
party is not liable to pay according to a contract which is
ultra vires, that fact is not permitted to work injustice where
the law can afford a remedy without enforcing the illegal
contract, and the courts will give relief where it can be given
independent of the contract. It would be unjust to hold
that one who has received money or property under a contract which is ultra vires need not account for it because the
contract was ultra vires, but the law implies a contract to
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return what has been received. Where a contract is not
malum in se or malum prohibitum, and it has been executed
or benefits have been received, the party benefited, whether
the corporation or an individual, will not be permitted to
retain the fruits of the transaction without compensation.
Where a contract is ultra vires and a corporation has. received money under it which in equity and good conscience
belongs to another and which it ought to pay over, it is liable
for it in an action for money had and received with interest
after demand. An action, for the recovery of the money
would not enforce or affirm the original contract but would
disaffirm it." From the foregoing opinions which have been
expressed by eminent jurists, it would be reasonably safe
to draw the conclusion that a recovery on a quantum meruit
for the benefits received under the contract is allowed not
only against the corporation where it has received benefits
through the performance by the other party, but also by
the corporation as to which the contract was ultra vires
against the other party who received the benefits through
the performance by the corpora tion, for it would be in the
highest degree inequitable and unjust to permit such a thing
to ever come about. So if a corporation has received money
or property or the benefit of services under an ultra vires
contract the courts are virtually agreed that it may be compelled to refund the value of that which it has actually received in an action quasi ex contractu, or, in a proper case
in a suit for an accounting. The limitation of the contractual
power of a corporation does not prevent it from making
restitution of money or property obtained under an unauthorized contract. Thus, where a corporation enters into an
ultra vires contract to purchase merchandise for speculation,
and the contract is partly performed by the seller he may
recover on a quantum meruit for the merchandise delivered
though he refuses further to perform the contract, and the
corporation cannot recover damages for the refusal further
to perform, and in just such a case the Michigan Court in
Day vs. the Spiral Springs Buggy Company 23 N.W. 628,
said: "It is to be observed that the contract, though void in
law, involved no element of criminality and nothing of an
immoral nature. The case is not, therefore, one in which the
law will leave the parties without redress for the conse-
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quences of criminal or immoral action." Moreover, if the
other party to the ultra vires contract has received benefits
from the corporation under the contract the corporation
may recover back the reasonable value of such benefits-in
quasi contract. Thus in the Illinois case of the United States
Brewing Company vs. the Dolese and Shepard Company
102 N.E. 753a, brewing corporation made an ultra vires
contract by which it took a lease of real property agreeing
to construct and maintain thereon a building for a saloon
and boarding house; the lease providing that should the
district within which the premises were located become prohibition or local option within three years the lessor should
pay the corporation the cost price of the improvements, and
within the specified period the district became prohibition
territory, and the court held that since such contract, though
ultra vires, was neither immoral nor contrary to public policy, the corporation, though not entitled to enforce the contract, was nevertheless entitled to recover the reasonable
value of the building erected.
However, the difference is looked upon by many courts
with disfavor wherever it is presented for the purpose of
avoiding an obligation which a corporation has assumed
merely in excess of the powers conferred upon it, and which
is otherwise legal and equitable and not in violation of some
express prohibition of the statutes; and in the modern case
especially the rule has been frequently announced that the
plea of ultra vires should not be allowed to prevail, whether
interposed in behalf of or against a corporation, when it
will not advance justice, but, on the contrary, will accomplish a legal wrong. In many jurisdictions the plea of ultra
vires is looked on with such disfavor that the rule seems to
prevail that if the corporation has received the benefits growing out of a contract such contract will be enforced against
it unless it was entered into through fraud or there are persuasive considerations of public policy involved, and this is
commonly known as the prevailing rule. According to this
rule which is followed by many courts which it must' be
acknowledged are in the majority, a recovery directly upon
the contract is permitted on the ground that the corporation having received money or property or services by virtue
of a contract not immoral or illegal of itself is estopped to
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deny liability, and the only remedy is one on behalf of the
State to punish the corporation for violating the law. The
reasons supporting the doctrine allowing a recovery on an
ultra vires contract itself are clearly set out in the following
cases from which it would be well to quote portions of the
opinions rendered therein. In the case of the Zinc Carbonate
Company vs. the First National Bank, 79 N.W. 229, the
Wisconsin court gave voice to the following: "If a corporation obtains a wrongful advantage of another in regard to
a transaction outside its corporate powers, it cannot shield
itself from liability to remedy the wrong by the doctrine of
ultra vires. Ordinarily, as to executed matters, the doctrine
of ultra vires is an instrument to be used only by the State
to punish a corporation for violating its charter, not by the
corporation itself nor an individual to aid in the perpetrating or perpetuating of a wrong. The doctrine of ultra vires
is a most powerful weapon to keep private corporations
within their legitimate sphere, and to punish them for violations of their corporate charters, and it probably is not invoked too often; but to place the power in the hands of the
corporation itself or a private individual to be used by it
or him as a means of obtaining or retaining something of
value which belongs to another would turn an instrument
intended to effect justice between the State and the Corporation into one of fraud as between the latter innocent
parties." The Indiana court in the leading case of Wright
vs. Hughes 119 Ind. 324, said: "Like natural persons corporations must be held to the observance of the recognized
principles of common honesty and good faith, and these
principles render the doctrine of ultra vires unavailing when
its application would accomplish an unjust end or result in
the perpetration of a legal fraud. After a corporation has
received the fruits which grow out of the performance of
an act ultra vires, and the mischief has all been accomplished,
it comes with an ill grace then to assert its want of power
to do the act or make the contract in order to escape the
performance of an obligation it has assumed. Where a contract has been executed and fully performed on the part
of the corporation or of the party with whom it contracted
neither will be permitted to insist that the contract was not
within the powers of the corporation." The Michigan court
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is of the same opinion as is shown by the case of Blackwood
vs. the Lansing Chamber of Commerce, 144 N.W. 823, for
in that case this particular court said: "Except in cases
ivhere the rights of the public are involved the plea of ultra
vires, whether interposed for or against a corporation, will
not be allowed to prevail when it will not advance justice,
but will accomplish a legal wrong. The great mass of judicial authority seems to be to the effect that where a private
corporation has entered into a contract in excess of its
granted powers, and has received the fruits or benefits of
the contract and an action brought against it to enforce the
obligation on its part, it is estopped from setting up the defense that it had no power to make it." From this it seems
that in those states in which this relaxed rule of ultra vires
prevails, the law never sustains the defense of ultra vires
out of regard for the corporation, and in the cases where it
does so the most persuasive considerations of public policy
are involved. But this rule is never applied to ultra vires
contracts which are executory on both sides for, as we have
seen, they cannot in such instances be enforced, nor to such
contracts so executed as to both parties for, as will be remembered, courts refuse to undo what has been done in such
cases. Nor has the rule any application to those cases where
the contract by statute or contrary to public policy, or otherwise in contravention of law, for in the language of the
Indiana court in the case of the Franklin National Bank
vs. Whitehead 149 Ind. 560 "The doctrine that where a
corporation enters into a contract merely beyond its powers,
which if made by a private person would have been binding
upon him, and such contract has been performed by the
other party thereto, the corporation will not be permitted
to deny its powers to make such contract, does not apply to
contracts that are forbidden by statute or are contrary to
public policy. The only cases to which this rule is applicable
are those where the contract has been fully performed or
executed on one side only, and either party has received
benefits under the contract in the form of money, property
or service. - Thus where one has bought property from a
corporation and is sued for the price he cannot set up in
defense that the corporation had no power to buy and sell
the property, and as the New York court held in the case of
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the Holmes and Griggs Manufacturing Company vs. the
Holmes and Wessell Metal Company, 27 N.E. 831. So also
where a street railway company, as was done in the Indiana
case of the State Board of A4griculture vs. the Citizens Street
Railway Company, 47 Ind. 407, agreed to pay a certain
sum if the State Board of Agriculture would hold the state
fair at a certain place, and the fair was held at the place
agreed upon and the street railway company had had the
benefit therefrom in its increased traffic, it was held that
the company could not subsequently set up the defense of
ultra vires to defeat liability on its contract. And likewise,
where a corporation contracted to pay a certain person a
commission for securing a factory site for it, and this site
he later actually acquired, although the contract was in excess of the charter powers of the defendant, it was held by
the Indiana court, in the case of the Seamless Pressed Steel
and ManufacturingCompany vs. Monroe 57 Ind. App. 136,
in which similar facts were presented, that since the corporation had received a benefit under the contract, it could not,
when sued thereon, set up ultra vires as a defense thereto.
Still another striking example is to be found in the Michigan case of Blackwood vs. the Lansing Chamber of Commerce 144 N.W. 823, where an incorporated Chamber of
Commerce contracted in good faith for the holding of a
Chautauqua meeting, and the contract was carried out by
the other party thereto, in view of the fact that there was
nothing against public policy in promoting a Chautauqua.
the defense of ultra vires was not allowed to prevail. From
the illustrations of the applications of this relaxed rule of
ultra vires there can be drawn the following conclusion
which can be safely stated as a general rule in those jurisdictions which allow recovery directly on the ultra vires contract: Where the making of the contract is merely beyond
the power of the corporation, but it has by its promise induced the other party to perform his part of the contract,
so that upon failure of the corporation to perform its part
the parties will not be left in their previous situation, and
the corporation has received benefit from the performance
of the other party, the corporation will be held liable upon
the contract. But the right of action is not limited to the
other party to the contract. If the corporation has per-
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formed its part of the contract it may maintain an action
too. Where the contract has been in good faith fully performed by the other party, and the corporation has had the
full benefit of the performance and of the contract, the corporation cannot avail itself of the defense of ultra vires.
The same rule can be conversely stated, and then it would
have the same force and effect. If the other party to the contract has had the benefit of a contract fully performed by
the corporation, the law will not permit him to relieve himself from liability on the ground that the contract and performance were not within the legitimate powers of the corporation. To render this doctrine applicable, the benefits
received must have come from the other party to the contract. In other words, the courts which have adopted this
prevailing rule require that there shall have been some performance on the part of the plaintiff which will render it
unjust and inequitable, and contrary to the first principles
of equity and justice to permit the defendant to set up the
ultra vires character of the contract in defense for if there
has been no performance no injustice would result from a
refusal to lend aid in enforcing an ultra vires contract. As
was said in the Iowa case of the Marshalltown Stone Company vs. the Des Moines Brick Manufacturing Company,
126 N.W. 190, "Where a private corporation has entered
into a contract in excess of its general powers, and has received the benefit thereof, it is estopped from setting up
the defense in an action to enforce performance on its part
that it was without power to make the contract. An examination of the cases supporting this relaxed rule of ultra vires
will show that the foundation upon which the doctrine is
said to rest is generally that of an equitable estoppel. In
this connection the Colorado court in the case of the Denver
Fire Insurance Company vs. McClelland, 9 Pac. 771, expressed the following opinion: "We are aware that the
courts have been very slow to concede that a defendant setting up, as a defense, the ultra vires of a contract, where
said contract was clearly not authorized, should be held liable
on the contract, since this would appear to sustain the enforcement of an unauithorized contract, and, therefore, the
cases show that whenever the courts would avoid this seeming inconsistency by resting the recovery upon some other

THE

NOTRE DAME LAWYER

ground they have done so. This has often led to equal inconsistency in other directions. The true ground would seem
to be that of equitable estoppel whereby the defendant is
not permitted to rely upon or show the invalidity of a contract. In such case the contract is assumed by the court to
be valid; the party seeking to avoid it not being permitted
to attack its character in this respect." But, as we have
seen before, a person dealing with a corporation is charged
with notice of the limitations of its powers, and for this
reason it is not easy to raise an estoppel in his favor. But
the Indiana Appellate court in the case of Voris vs. the Star
City Building and Loan Association, 20 Ind.App. 630, said
"One who deals with a corporation is presumed to know its
powers and the limitations of its authority, - and hence is
estopped to plead its want of authority." When the necessity arises for raising an estoppel in favor of the corporation which could not have been misled by the other partyto the ultra vires contract in respect to its own powers, it
is found still more difficult to do so than it is in the case of
the other party to the contract. -The use of the term
"estoppel" in this respect has been criticized for the foregoing reasons. The Kansas court in Harris vs. the Independence Gas Company, 92 Pac. 1123, seeking to find an
excuse for the application of the doctrine of estoppel to
ultra vires contracts gallantly defended this use of the term
in the following language: "It is argued that as a corporation must know the terms of its own charter, and as one dealing with it is charged with like knowledge, neither party
to an ultra vires contract can be misled in that respect, and,
therefore, there must always be lacking an essential element
of what could with technical accuracy be called estoppel.
This, however, is a mere question of terminology. The requirement that one shall be consistent in conduct-shall not
occupy contradictory positions-shall not retain the advantages of a transaction and reject its burdens-is often
spoken of as a form of estoppel. The term is convenient,
and if inaccurate is not misleading. This rule of estoppel
affords a good working hypothesis to accomplish just results." From this, it seems that for want of a better foundation upon which to rest this doctrine of allowing recovery
on ultra vires contracts, the courts following this prevailing
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rule have adopted and endeavored to consistently apply the
equitable doctrine of estoppel. The reasons by which the
courts have been influenced are not so much those of equitable estoppel as they are those arising from the development
of the close relationship existing today between corporations
and individuals. These reasons which are quite obvious
were recognized in the early New York case of Bissell vs.
the Michigan Southern and N. I. Railroad Company, 22
N. Y. 259, in which the Chief Justice said: "Commercial
manufacturing and trading corporations are brought into
relation with almost every member of the community, and
I think it greatly to be desired that in laying down the rules
of law which are to govern in such relations we should avoid
a system of destructive technicalities. Those rules should
be founded on the principles of justice which are recognized
in other and analogous dealings among men." The Indiana
court must have certainly had these reasons in mind when
it said, in substance, that it would be carrying the doctrine
concerning ultra vires contracts to an unwarranted extent
to hold that a corporation might obtain the money of another, and with the fruits of the contract in its treasury interpose the defense of ultra vires. As we have previously
seen, the rule requiring the observance of good faith and
fair dealing is as applicable to corporations as to individuals.
Neither can involve others in onerous engagements, and
with the consideration of the contract in their possession disavow their acts to the damage and discomfiture of others,
unless it clearly appears that there was an absolute want of
capacity to make the contract. In the administration of justice the promotion of public policy is one of the goals aimed
at by the courts and public policy is promoted by the discouragement of fraud and the maintenance of the obligation of contracts. In the well considered case of Wright vs.
Hughes, 119 Ind. 324 the Indiana court gave voice to the
following which has found favor in the courts of other states:
"Like natural persons, corporations must be held to the
observance of the recognized principles of common honesty
and good faith, and these principles render the doctrine of
ultra vires unavailing, when its application would accomplish an unjust end or result in the perpetration of a legal
fraud. After a corporation has received the fruits which
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grow out of the performance of an act ultra vires, and the
mischief has all been accomplished it comes with an ill grace
to assert its want of power to do the act or make the contract
in order to escape the performance of an obligation it has
assumed." So when a contract by a private corporation
which is otherwise unobjectionable has been performed on
one side, the party which has received and retained the benefits of such performance shall not be permitted to evade performance on the ground that the contract was in excess of
the purposes for which the corporation was created. There
are few rules better settled or more strongly supported by
authorities, with fewer exceptions, in this country, than that
just stated which, though it may not be what one would call
strictly logical, prevents a great deal of injustice.
Having seen the divergence of opinion which has arisen
adjudications in some of the courts, and which has been the
source of the two doctrines concerning the ultra vires contracts of corporations, it would be no more than natural
for us to seek more light on this subject and by comparing
the strict or Federal rule and the prevailing rule see wherein
they are different, and wherein they are alike. The two
great points of difference are: 1, the effect of the execution
of the contract by one of the contracting parties, whether
the party be the corporation or the individual, upon the right
of him so performing to invoke the aid of the court in enforcing the contract; and 2, the nature of the action in which
recovery is sought and allowed when the contract has been
fully performed on one side and either party has received
benefits under the contract. The strict, or Federal, rule is
that the incurring of expenses, or the sustaining of losses,
or even full performance on the part of one of the contracting parties, does not render the other one liable on the contract itself for the contract being wholly null and void cannot be made the foundation of an action by either party.
The prevailing rule, which is the very opposite of the Federal rule, allows a recovery on the ultra vires contract itself,
if such contract is objectionable merely because it is in excess
of the powers conferred upon the corporation by its charter,
not being otherwise contrary to law, and it has been so far
performed or acted upon by one of the parties that it would
be inequitable and unjust to hold the contract void. The
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courts adopting and following the strict Federal rule refuse
to permit the retention of money or property received under
an ultra vires contract, and so they allow actions quasi ex
contractu in disaffirmance of the contract to be maintained,
while the courts adopting and following the relaxed prevailing rule do not resort to such subterfuges in order to do
justice between the parties by allowing actions quasi ex contractu-actions not on the express contract itself but on an
implied contract to be maintained. But instead, they come
out in the open and allow actions ex contractu-actions on
the very contracts themselves-to be maintained. In this
respect the difference is not so much in the results sought
and obtained as it is in the methods used to reach and obtain those results. The difference is to be found in the theories of the -various actions made use of in obtaining relief
under partly performed ultra vires contracts. The courts
adopting the strict or Federal rule indirectly do what the
other courts adopting the relaxed prevailing rule directly
do, and obtain practically the same results that the latter
courts obtain. In the former courts the actions are maintained on the theory of implied contract, while in the latter
the actions are based on the express contracts themselves.
So this particular difference lies in the means used to reach
the end sought, which is practically the same in all cases.
According to what would seem the more logical view,
which it must be admitted is .not one in which justice is the
guiding star, a corporation, though it has received the benefits of a strictly ultra vires contract, is not estopped
to set up the defense of ultra vires when sued upon the contract, though it is universally recognized that a recovery
may, at least, be had on a quantum meruit for the benefits
received by the corporation. So in accordance with this view,
which we have seen has been taken by one line of casesthose in which there has been an application of the strict or
Federal rule-a recovery directly upon an ultra vires contract is denied, though there has been a performance by the
party seeking to enforce the contract on the ground that the
contract is void, and no act of either party can give it any
validity. Still, the courts adopting this view, which it must
be confessed are in the minority, have always striven to do
justice between the parties so far as could be done consis-
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tently with adherence -to law, by permitting property or
money parted with on the faith of the unlawful contract to
be recovered back or compensation to be made for it.- In
such case the action is not maintained upon the unlawful
contract, nor according to its terms, but on an implied contract of the defendant to return, or failing to do that to
make compensation for property or money which it had no
right to retain. To maintain such an action is not to affirm
but to disaffirm the unlawful contract. On the other hand,
according to the view taken by the other courts, which are
those following the relaxed prevailing rule, and which it
must be admitted are in the majority, a recovery directly
upon the contract is permitted on the ground that the corporation having received money or property by virtue of a
contract not immoral or illegal of itself, is estopped to deny
liability, for these courts look upon the defense of ultra vires
with disfavor whenever it is presented for the purpose of
avoiding an obligation which a corporation has assumed
merely in excess of the powers conferred upon it and not
in violation of some express provision of the statute, and,
as has been frequently announced in the modern cases, the
plea of ultra vires should not be allowed to prevail, whether
interposed for or against a corp 6 ration, when it will not advance justice, but on the contrary, will accomplish a legal
wrong. The doctrine allowing a recovery on an ultra vires
contract is the better doctrine, and has the support of the
great weight of decision. The want of authority may render
a contract void, but the mere want of authority, without
more, does not render a contract illegal, so that it can, under
no circumstances, give rise to an action. Contracts are illegal either in respect to the consideration or the promise. A
promise by an individual founded on a lawful consideration
to do that which in itself is lawful to be done is legal. A
similar promise by a corporation is just as legal, although
the transaction contemplated is not -within the powers
granted by its charter, and therefore ultra vires, and there
is no good valid reason why causes of action may not arise
out of it. For these reasons, if for no other, the prevailing
rule should be given the preference over the strict ot Federal
rule when the question comes before a court as to which one
it shall adopt and follow.
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It would be well for us, before we leave the subject,
to see whether there is a presumption of ultra vires or not.
It may be safely accepted as a general proposition that
there is no presumption that a corporation has exceeded its
powers, for the presumption is never to be indulged in that
parties in making their contracts intended to violate the
law, and furthermore the law presumes in favor of a contract and not against it. Therefore, the defense of ultra vires
must be pleaded. The Kentucky court in the comparatively
recent case of Martin vs. the Kentucky Lands Investment
Company, 142 S.W. 1038, held that there is no presumption
that a corporation has exceeded its powers, but ultra vires
is a matter to be pleaded as a defense, and the Michigan
court in Blackwood vs. the Lansing Chamber of Commerce
144 N.W. 823, was of the same opinion when it said that
the defense of ultra vires is a special defense not available
under the general issue but must be specially pleaded. So it
would be consistent with sound legal principles to plead
ultra vires should the occasion arise where such fact would
be a good defense, and moreover such fact should be pleaded
in that event.

